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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the Interest of: 
: Case No. 
MICHAEL GENE TANNER, JR., 14174 
(8/18/59) : 
A Minor. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the Utah Department of Social 
Services, Division of Family Services, from the order requiring 
said Division to provide orthodonture services to the above-
named Juvenile. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was ordered to provide such orthodonture 
services to Michael Gene Tanner, Jr., as are required to correct 
his dental condition, by the Second District Juvenile Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Regnal 
W. Garff, Jr., presiding* 
On February 7, 1975, the matter was brought before the 
Court on an affidavit for order to show cause and on June 2, 1975, 
the court entered its judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the judgment of the Juvenile Court 
be set aside. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent is a minor whose mother is deceased and the 
whereabouts of his father are unknown. He was placed in the guar-
dianship of the State Division of Family Services by legal order 
of the Juvenile Court dated June 26, 1967 after the court had 
made a finding, essentially, that the parents had abandoned the 
child and had also failed to obtain proper and necessary medical 
care for the child. On July 30, 1971, upon the motion of the 
State Division of Family Services, that agency was relieved of 
guardianship, and guardianship was placed with Mr. and Mrs. Mel-
vin Edwards, who had been the long-term foster parents for the 
child under the State's Foster Care Program. The State Division 
of Family Services was ordered to continue to pay for the support, 
maintenance and other necessary care for the child. At a subse-
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quent hearing on July 25, 1973, in the petition for renewal of 
custody filed by a representative of the State Division of Family 
Services, Lois M. Pollard, the court entered a further order in 
the matter placing custody of the child with Mr, and Mrs. Melvin 
Edwards, and guardianship was vested again in the State Division 
of Family Services, with that agency ordered to pay for the sup-
port and maintenance of the child and other necessary care. 
Respondent, presently, has dental difficulties that may 
require orthodonture work for their correction. On July 27, 1973, 
the Juvenile Court appointed David S. Dolowitz to represent the 
respondent to attempt to secure orthodonture work to correct his 
dental condition. The said attorney, on behalf of respondent, 
entered into a series of negotiations with the agents and employees 
of the Division of Family Services to secure orthodonture services 
that were needed to correct the dental condition of the juvenile, 
but he was unable to secure the necessary treatment for respondent. 
The Division of Family Services of the Utah State Department of 
Social Services refused to provide orthodonture services to the 
respondent on grounds that respondent did not meet the minimum 
standards developed for orthodontia treatment, under its limited 
funded dental program. Respondent, subsequently, through his 
attorney, moved for an order to show cause and on June 2, 1975, 
the Second District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Regnal W. Garff, Jr., presiding, after 
considering the testimony of the witnesses and the records, files, 
papers, and memoranda of law in the foregoing matter, and the 
Court having entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, ordered the Division of Family Services of the Utah State.. 
Department of Social Services to provide orthodonture services 
to the respondent, Michael Gene Tanner, Jr. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUVENILE COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER 
THE DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL-SERVICES TO PROVIDE ORTHODENTURE SERVICES TO THE 
RESPONDENT. 
The Juvenile Court in its conclusions of law in this 
case quotes from Utah's statutory definition of guardianship to 
show that the guardian has "among other things, the authority 
to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed forces, and 
to consent to major medical, surgical or psychiatric treatment." 
§ 55-10-64(9) Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended 1965. The Court 
then goes on to say: 
"Under this provision, the guardian 
has the authority and the obligation to 
consent to major medical and surgical 
procedures, which the Court concludes this 
type of orthodontic treatment to be." 
(emphasis supplied). 
Making the authority to consent to surgery syonomous 
with the obligation to consent is not warranted here, either by 
the intent of the statute or by the clear meaning of the words. 
And further more, even if the Court were correct in identifying 
an obligation to consent, that is not identical with an obliga-
tion to pay for such care. 
"It is ordinarily for the parent in 
the first instance to decide, however, 
what is actually necessary for the pro-
tection and preservation of the life and 
health of his child, so long as he acts 
as a reasonable and ordinarily prudent 
parent would act in a like situation." 
(59 Am Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, § 15, 
Medical Care, at 98.) 
Under Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-15a-3, the 
Department of Social Services is authorized to develop standards 
and administer policies relating to eligibility for medical 
assistance. The Department may limit the medical assistance 
furnished an applicant to particular types of care or services 
to payment of part or all costs of care medically determined to 
be mecessary. Section 55-15a-3 also provides: 
"The Department shall develop policy 
for the payment of medical claims for 
indigent persons under unusual or extenuat-
ing circumstances and consult community 
health representatives in developing medical 
assistance policy and in establishing an 
appropriate definition of 'medically needy'." 
The Department has done this through its various 
Divisions and their respective programs. In this particular 
case the issue is whether the Division of Family Services can 
be compelled to provide a particular service when the child in 
question has been found to be ineligible for that particular 
service according to the standards usually applied for determin-
ing eligibility for the service. 
In Rickman v. Rickman, 96 S. 2d 574, 265 Ala. 371 
(1957) the court affirmed a decree which modified a prior 
divorce decree by requiring the father "...to pay the expenses 
of necessary orthodonture treatment for his minor child,..." 
(266 Ala. at page 376, 96 So. 2d at page 677.) There is, however, 
authority for the proposition that a parent must support his 
child reasonably depending on his financial resources and other 
demands on his funds. (Cowen v. Cowen, 65 So. 2d 196, 259 Ala. 
37 (1953). The distinction between Rickman and this case is 
that in Rickman, on the appeal, the father apparently did not 
make objection to paying directly to the orthodontist. Here the 
Division of Family Services strenuously objects to providing 
orthodontic services on grounds that respondant does not meet 
the eligibility standards of its limited funded dental program. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in Kearney v. Blue, 301 
P.2d 515 (1956), in acting on a petition in dependency stated 
"the juvenile court, being a creature of statutory provision, 
is confined to the mandates of the statute creating it and 
defining its operation." The Utah Supreme Court has likewise 
recognized the basic principle that the Juvenile Court is of 
-6-
legislative creation and may therefore exercise only the powers 
given it by that body. (State of Utah in the Interest of 
Keeran v. DeValmont, 27 Utah 2d 347, 496 P.2d 265). Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 55-10-71 gives the Board of Juvenile Court 
judges the authority to formulate uniform rules and forms 
governing practice and procedure, consistent with the provisions 
of that act and any rules that may be promulgated by the Supreme 
Court for the Juvenile Court. Subsection (L:Q further provides 
that "the powers to contract and expend funds shall be subject 
to budgetary control and procedures as provided by law. " 
The Utah Legislature has explicitly recognized the 
necessity for the Division of Family Services', to maintain ex-
clusive control over the expenditure of funds appropriated to 
it for its various programs. The 1975 Appropriation Act, con-
tains the following provision in Paragraph 161, the item which 
makes an appropriation to the Division of Family Services: 
"It is the intent of the Legislature 
that funds appropriated to the Division 
of Family Services may not be expended 
for the purpose of support or other ex-
pense for a child placed in any institu-
tion, facility, home, school, or other 
setting or program, which is not licensed, 
regulated, or otherwise approved by the 
Division of Family Services pursuant to 
its regulations and policies." (Laws of 
Utah, 1975, Chapter 213, Item 161, enacted 
Feb. 28, 1975). 
The Division must take the position that the expendi-
ture of funds for the contemplated orthodic work would be for a 
program not approved by the Division and therefore not per-
missible under the cited appropriation. Appellant therefore, 
submits that if the Juvenile Court does have the authority to 
order the Division of Family Services to provide orthodonture 
services to qualified applicants, then the Juvenile Courts 
authority must be limited to depend on the Department's 
financial resources and other demands on its funds. Respondents 
contention that the state, as guardian, must provide for its 
ward any orthodonture services needed, without regard to financial 
resources available and other demands on its funds, must there-
fore, be dismissed as being without merit. 
Appellant agrees with respondent that the state has a 
contractual obligation with the federal government under 45 
C.F.R. § 205, 146, as amended to provide early and periodic 
screening, diagnosis and treatment of children under Title XIX 
of the Social Security Act, and to assure that each child receives 
proper care in its Foster Care Program. Appellant submits, 
however, that the State also has a contractual responsibility 
with the Federal Government, as noted in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 55-15a~14, "to comply with all requirements of the Social 
Security Act and all orders, rules and regulations promulgated 
thereunder when required as a condition of participation in 
benefits under the Social Security Act." Further it has a con-
tractual responsibility, under 45 C.R.F. Section 250.18 to: 
"(a) provide that the medical assistance 
unit of the single state agency will establish 
and implement a statewide surveillance and 
utilization control program that safeguards 
against unnecessary or inappropriate utiliza-
tion of care and services available under the 
plan, and excess payments, and that assesses 
the quality of such services..." 
Appellant further submits that under this contractual 
relationship with the federal government, the "single state 
agency" requirement under 45 C.F.R. §220.2, which specifies that 
there must be a single organizational unit, within the single 
state agency, at the state level and also at the local level to 
provide or supervise all services to families with children in-
cluded in the State Plan for Title IV, parts A and B, was 
implemented to protect the state in its accountability for use 
of its federal grant in accordance with the conditions of the 
grant. Thus, the authority and responsibility of the single 
state agency must not be impaired by being subject to external 
control of expenditures. 
It is, therefore, essential that any court review of 
an agency decision be limited to a determination as to whether 
the action of the agency was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
capricious. 
The jurisdiction of the juvenile court must be limited 
to remanding the matter to the state agency for a redetermination 
of the issues by the state agency in accordance with the court's 
analysis of any legal provisions and its opinion as to any failure 
to observe the essential requirements for a fair hearing. In 
dealing with assistance and services, Utah Code Annotated, 
Sections 55-15a-25 and 55-15b-18 allow an applicant or recipient 
a right to appeal to the Department of Social Services and such 
person is entitled to reasonable notice and a hearing. The 
respondent herein has not exhausted all administrative remedies 
available to him, and for that reason should not be allowed to 
obtain services through the Juvenile Court. 
In a recent case, Winifred K. Pazdera v. Dept. of 
Health and Social Services, Wisconsin Circuit Court, Dane County, 
(case No. 139-372, Memorandum Decision dated February 4, 1974, 
reported in Poverty Law Reporter, §18, 871, the court held that 
the provisions in the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social 
Services handbook for dentists that required prior authorization 
by the Department's dental consultant as a condition precedent 
to a dentist who provided orthodonture services securing payment 
under the medical assistance program administered under Section 
49.45, Wis. Stats., were a reasonable and valid regulation 
authorized by Section 49.45(2) (a). The medical assistance 
program was federally funded under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act and 42 U.S.C. §1396 (a) (30) specified that the state 
plan should provide procedures that might be necessary to safe-
guard against unnecessary utilization of the authorized services. 
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Therefore, the juvenile court should have denied 
respondent's petition for order to show cause and required 
respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies. To allow 
the juvenile court the authority to order the Division of 
Family Services of the Department of Social Services to provide 
orthodonture services to respondent would not only be administra-
tively and economically unfeasible but could also jeopardize the 
Department of Social Services from further receiving federal 
funds, by failing to comply with federal requirements. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I I 
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE SALZMAN 
INDEX USED IN DETERMINING APPLICANT ELIGIBILITY UNDER 
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICE"S TITLE XIX ORTHODONTIC 
PROGRAM TO BE INTRODUCED. 
The Department of Social Services has a contract with 
Delta Dental Plan, a Utah Non-Profit Corporation composed of 
members duly licensed by the State of Utah to practice Dentistry 
in the state, to provide fiscal agent services and treatment 
utilization review services for dental care under the state's 
Title XIX dental program. Utah Code Annotated, § 55~15a-7, 
allows for the Department of Social Services through the office 
of Assistance Payments to contract with other public or private 
agencies to provide medical services in connection with the 
programs of the Department. Further, Title XIX, of the Social 
Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1396 et seq. , 
requires that dental care provided under a state plan to re-
ceive financial participation from the federal government must 
be provided in a manner to assure prudent administration and 
high quality care. 
Respondent objected to admitting the Salzman Index 
as being irrelevant evidence; he argues that it is not the 
state's Title XIX program on which he is basing his action but, 
rather on the Division of Family Service's fidciary responsi-
bility as the guardian of the child to meet the needs of the 
child under its foster care program, Title IV-A, Section 606 D 
of the Social Security Act. Respondent would have this court 
believe that the Juvenile Court has the authority to order the 
Division of Family Services to provide orthodonture services 
to a child without some rational, non-arbitrary, non-capricious 
method of determinging eligibility. 
Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines 
"relevant evidence" as meaning evidence having any tendency in 
reason to prove or disprove the existence of any material fact. 
And the contract states that Delta Plan shall provide utiliza-
tion review services for the Department as follows: 
"(2) to approve treatment for those 
patients who have been qualified by the 
Dental Section of the Division of Health 
or such other person or persons as Delta 
may designate with concurrence of the 
state agency. Such eligibility will be 
determined by use of the Salzman Index 
in order that an impartial method of 
qualification for eligibility will be 
used. Inasmuch as there are limited 
budgetary funds for the dental pro-'. 
gram and since it is the intent of 
the state agency and Delta to treat 
as many children as possible with 
the available funds, the Index number 
will start at 34 but may be adjusted 
downward to include additional children 
until approvals have obligated the 
available funds." 
,'f 
The Salzman Index, which is a nationally known ortho-
dontic Index for the classification of severity of orthodontic 
cases, describes first, the procedures to be followed in assess-
ing orthodontic cases, and secondly, a list of criteria of 
instructions on which that assessment is made and an evaluation 
sheet. The-present orthodontic program provided by the state 
through the Delta Plan uses the Salzman Index to determine 
whether a particular situation is severe enough to warrant ex-
penditure of state funds to correct it. The Index is rational 
and objective in establishing a point scale of severity. It 
has been statistically determined that the funds which have 
been allocated by the State for this service would be insuffi-
cient if cases with a Salzman Index severity of less than 34 
were approved for treatment. Therefore the cut-off point was 
established at 34. The respondent in this case did not have 
a severity of 34 when measured on the Salzman Index. Thus 
appellant submits that the Salzman Index as implemented under 
the State's Title XIX Program should have been considered as 
being revelant in determining whether respondent's needs 
dictate orthodontic treatment or whether the Division of Family 
Services abused its descretion under its Social Services Program 
by refusing to provide orthodontic treatment to respondent. 
The Salzman Index criteria, as part of the state's Title XIX 
dental program which is used in coordination with the State's 
Foster Care Program, is relevant to show that respondent did not 
meet eligibility standards as required by federal regulations 
under the state's limited funded dental program. 
The Salzman Index is a particularly crucial factor in 
this dispute since the state may become subject to charges that 
it has denied equal protection of the law to other applicants 
for orthodontic work. This situation will arise if the present 
applicant is approved having a Salzman Index score several 
points below the cut-off point at which eligibility is determined 
for other applicants. All those who have been screened for the 
state's orthodontic program and who have fallen on the Salzman 
Scale at a point between where the respondent in the present 
case fell and where the state law established the cut-off for 
eligibility would have an arguable claim that they had been 
denied the equal protection of the law. The state would be 
hard-put to justify the providing of services to a person who 
had a lower eligibility on the index while denying them to a 
person who had a lower eligibility. Yet this is precisely what 
what would result should the respondent prevail in the present 
case. 
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Rule 5 of Utah Rules of Evidence allows this court to 
set aside the Juvenile Courts judgment on the grounds that the 
excluded evidence had a substantial influence in bringing about 
a different finding. Thus, the Juvenile Court's finding and 
conclusion of law that respondent was eligible for orthodonic 
treatment without reviewing the procedures to be followed in 
assessing orthodonture care and the list of criteria of instruc-
tions on which that assessment was made and the evaluation sheet 
is, without doubt, reversible error. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the 
Juvenile Court had no authority to order the Division of Family 
Services of the Utah State Department of Social Services to 
provide orthodonture treatment to respondent. First, the 
Juvenile Court should take into consideration other financial 
resources available and any demands on funds. Second, the 
Juvenile Court cannot make any administrative decisions regard-
ing applicant eligibility which is the sole responsibility of 
the state agency, third, respondent failed to exhaust all 
administrative remedies available to him through the Department. 
It is also clear that the Juvenile Court erred in not allowing 
the Salzman Index, used in determining applicant eligibility 
under the Department of Social Services' Title XIX Orthodontic 
Program, to be introduced into evidence. 
Therefore, the appellant respectfully submits that 
the judgment of the Juvenile Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
/ J^—^U^^fijts^ 
PAUL M. TINKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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